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Abstract 
        Since the Great Depression and the stock market crash in 1929, the global economy has experienced 
immersive development. This paper will analyze the effects of the involvement of governments in rescuing failing 
banks through different methodological tools. The purpose of this research is to fill the gap that exists in the 
literature on these issues and raise awareness of the moral hazard that is increasing over time world-widely. 
Findings and evidence are presented from one of the methods used to discuss the government stance and/or 
whether the government should intervene in the period of crisis. After presenting the arguments, the application 
and usefulness of this paper to data collection will be presented in relatable content.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history banking sector was tested through different crises. As a result, we have banks 
which were structured in a way that they can respond to a variety of crisis more efficiently and effectively 
decreasing the risk systematically. As the prevention against these crises, policies were created to mitigate issues 
that were the result of unsupervised financial bodies that are controlling citizen’s welfare and the capital. Banks 
are earning profit by leveraging money in terms of loans, charging interest rates on these loans from the 
borrowers. While at the same time, the bank is using money deposits from the savers who are in a desire to 
increase the wealth by accumulating interest rates on these savings, over time. In order to decrease the risk, 
banks are diversifying investments to different investments, hedge, pensions, and mutual funds (Halilbegovic & 
Sabic, 2018).  
Over time, due to poor choices and decisions made by banking investors and managers, the systematic 
risk was increasing and it leads to some of the major crisis starting for the beginning of the 20th century and The 
Great Depression which represents the worst economic crisis remembered, leaving millions of people in despair 
and poverty. Governments around the world created the governing mechanism called Central Banks intending to 
create and impose rules and regulations to the banks preventing any future crisis and handling conflicts inside 
their domain.  
The central banks are perceived as an upper body, controlled by the government, which can rescue failing 
banks of closure, preventing the greater impact on the general society (Hoggarth, Reidhill et al, 2004). Apathetic 
relationship between banks and regulators often results in "information failure", where one party possesses a 
greater amount of information than the opposite party on the bad credits in the financial statements, producing 
the moral- hazard behavior, which ultimately leads to bank’s liquidation or the government bailout. (Mitchell, 
2000) 
 “Too-big-to-fail” is a concept constructed around the expectation that the failure or the liquidation of the 
bank will disrupt the economic system and stability of a country. When the government notices first signs of 
insolvency, regulators present the number of strategies on how the bank can rescue themselves from failure. 
Usually, the first step is to activate private banks and encouraging them to purchase and save them (Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2009). In case that mechanism fails, the government decides on a strategy 
of the nationalization of banks, based on the potential possibility of losing the all capital investment or just part 
of it (Allen and Gale, 2000).  
When a crisis happens, policymakers around the globe must respond on questions, such are: 
1. Based on what segment the government will choose whether to acquire the bank or let it liquidate? 
2. What mechanisms need to be activated to rescue a failing bank? 
3. Should the government prolong the process of the closure or the acquisition of the bank if the resolutions 
are not working? 
This research paper is going to argue the government's involvement in rescuing failing banks using case 
studies as a methodology tool where from each case study will be taken out facts that are going to be analyzed 
and compared in order to answer the question, whether the government should bailout the failing business or not. 
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Also, it will be discussed and reviewed many different mechanisms for resolving crises.    
II.FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CRISES 
Before the financial and banking crisis, there are not many mentioning of bailouts in the available public 
literature. The first one who wrote on the topic of bailouts was Professor Cheryl Block, providing the outlines on 
developing “Public Bailout Policy”. Block (1992) showed the evidence that supports the argument that 
government bailouts produce negative unintended consequence on the insurance schemas.   
As a reaction to the financial crisis, there is a huge interest of scholars to write and discuss bailouts and its 
forms of implications on the financial system and also on the specific sectors. 
A financial institution is accumulating the capital, which grows over time, and they eventually “too-big-
to-fail”.  The closure or the liquidation of them would present a major threat different segments of everyday life, 
but a domestic economy and businesses would be the most affected. The government's main role, historically 
viewed, was to prevent the collapse of a financial system, providing them with a sense of security in terms of 
bailout guarantees. Due to this action created by the government, Professor Jeffrey Manns suggests the 
introduction of a set of rules which will limit bailouts. One of these limitations is that bailout guarantees are 
encouraging big sized institutions to make riskier investment and systematically increase the risk. This is worth 
noting since other scholars such is (Kornai et al. 2003) supported a similar claim.   
The exaggeration made from bank regulators in the post-crisis analysis indicates that not everything was 
done accordingly to policies. Scholar Edward Kane argues that this was done for increasing personal benefits 
and maintaining the influence among peers. The study would be more useful if it had recommendations proposed 
as the solution to this problem. However, Minsky (1971, 1982) correctly argues that untrusty and dishonest 
managers are not the main cause of the issue and that it could potentially be prevented by having more 
responsible upper management with better and stricter rules and regulations (Halilbegovic & Ertem, 2020). 
Some strategies are proposed in recent years in order to split-up large financial institutions into smaller 
ones in order to decrease the dependence of the great number of people to few institutions that are making 
generally high-risk investments and decisions (Wessel, 2009: A2) 
III. TOO BIG TO FAIL: IS IT WORTH IT? 
There aren't many benefits which are supporting the term "too-big-to-fail", except that they are reducing 
systematic risk. A weakness with this argument, however, is that we cannot find a piece of single evidence where 
there was a chain reaction of closing financial institutions, as the result of closing on one of the TBTF banks. 
This is worth nothing as there are many cases where the banks could fail without leaving a negative impact on 
the financial sector. Ennis & Malek (2005) confirmed in his study that there is not enough evidence that can 
confirm the connection between “the pattern of behavior (of bankers, policymakers, and creditors) linked to 
bailouts.” 
Moosa (2010) in his article summarized the list of arguments about the continuous usage of bailouts and 
against the term “too-big-to-fail”: 
• Political bodies are holding the power of classifying a financial institution as a TBTF institution. 
• The money used in the process of rescuing a failing bank can be spent to improve prospective sectors in 
the economy. 
• The government is promising TBTF the protection against the liquidation or closure while encouraging 
them to make irrational and risky decisions. 








Figure 1 - Flow chart to assist in the resolution of failed banks 
 
The flowchart, shown as Annex 1, is used as a guideline for managers who are dealing with the on-going 
crisis. It helps to decide what steps the manager has to take to resolve the problem. Asking the right questions 
and choosing the corrective tools are used to mitigate the problem, are more efficient and more effective. 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
For the purpose of this research paper case study methodology will be used to investigate more complex 
examples from the practice within their circumstances. It is significant way to study the theory, evaluate results 
and develop further actions (Baxter & Jack, 2010). Case studies of this papers explain examples of Government 
interventions from United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece. Information gathered from each case study is then 
analyzed and evaluate in order to create greater picture of what is done in practiced and whether it had positive 
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results. From the results of this analysis, recommendation for the future actions can be produced. 
V. CASE STUDIES: EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In 2013, the Co-operative bank announced the capital shortfall. The bank and bank holder decided to take 
the path of reliving the failing bank, introducing a commercially negotiated consensual bail-in. This way of 
proceeding transferred the burden of cost from the taxpayers to bondholders and depositors, resulting in the same 
outcome as "bailout". Problems manifested after Co-op Bank's takeover of the Britannia Building Society in 
2009, increasing the systematic risk of extensive lending. These issues only grew worse when Co-op Bank 
decided to bid for 600 Lloyd’s branches. 
Furthermore, the decision was made to use a debt-for-equity exchange option, in which bondholders are 
swapping debt for new bonds and equity in the bank. 
Co-op bank hoped to accumulate 1bn pounds in new assets in 2013, with an additional 500 million 
pounds, the following year. However, they failed to raise 1.5bn in capital required by the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) placing them with the Lower Tier 2 bondholders, directly depositing 125 million pounds by the 
end of that year. A positive outcome of using a consensual bail-in, realized them from a set deadline, in contrast 
to a bailout. This ultimately gave them more time to develop and adjust to impose regulations to complete the 
process of recapitalization. 
 
CYPRUS       
  In 2013, Cyprus accepted a proposal of recapitalizing the biggest bank, Bank of Cyprus using the bail-in 
method, while at the same time merging it with the second largest, Laiki bank. Uninsured depositors were 
summoned to recapitalize financial institutions, introducing controlling measures on capital spending. 
One of the main reasons, why Cyprus requested assistance was due to low capital shortcomings. This was 
caused by Cyprus’s involvement in a restructuring of the Greek debits, through “private sector involvement” 
resulting in compelling loses holding back their bonds. 
Europe Union with its finance ministers presented the new resolution for rescuing failing banks. They 
offered a 6.75% tax for "insured" depositors and 9.9% for "uninsured" depositors. To everyone surprise, they 
have rejected the proposal and leaving the banking system closed for two weeks. Meanwhile, the parliament 
swiftly giving the green light to the new law, used as a legal basis for new changes, allowing the Central Bank of 
Cyprus to mitigate the problem of insolvent banks. The sudden bail-in of depositors was recognized as unfair 
and immoral, especially because certain households and enterprises were holding loans and deposits at different 
banks, at the same time. Only deposits were available for the bail-in, contrary to loans. 
 
GREECE         
The capital and liquidity of Greek banks presented the main obstacle in restructuring the sovereign crisis. 
Regulators along with Greece created and implemented harsh fiscal policies. The bank liquidation was disrupted 
gradually and in addition to the decline of Greece credit ratings and they were fazed-out of the global market. 
The main resulted of this policy was creating 14 objectives with 40% of a decrease in the number of banks in 
Greece. 
After the request for the financial aid from the Greek Government, the Member States and IMF approved 
EUR 75bn heavy adjustment support program for domestic banks. In 2015, financial uncertainty was at its peak 
which urged the government to hold a referendum, which ultimately leads to "bank holiday” and “the imposition 
of capital controls.” 
Increasing capital requirements was mainly caused due to substandard Greek macro-economic position 
and the inability to restructure sovereign debt.   
VI. RESULTS 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
As an aftermath to government interventions in the UK, the cash was directed to recapitalize weak and 
flawed banks. Portion of that money was used for purchasing portions of HBOS and Lloyds TSB, and of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. The government nationalized the entire of Northern Stone and Bradford and Bingley. 
Additions to that, the two new institutions have been founded:  
- “UK Asset Resolution Limited” (UKAR), responsible for managing mortgages and loan portfolio of 
Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley;  
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-“UK Financial Investments” (UKFI), overseeing HM Treasury's shares in Lloyds, RBS and UKAR per 
their own attentiveness.  
The government bailout infused £137 billion of open cash in advances and funding to balance out the 
monetary framework, the vast majority of which has been recovered throughout the years. 
 
CYPRUS 
Cypriot resources of Laiki, alongside the “Emergency Liquidity Assistance” (ELA) and insured deposit 
liabilities of Laiki, were moved to BoC with the interests in abroad branches and divisions and the uninsured 
deposits of Laiki staying in an inheritance element. To recapitalize BoC, an expected 37.5 % of BoC's uninsured 
deposits were changed over into full democratic offers with extra value commitments from the inheritance of 
Laiki. In order to avoid capital flight, like it happened in the UK in 2007, the biggest piece of the remaining BoC 
uninsured deposits was block for short period of time. The final decision for the bail-in ("hair style"), was not 
decided until the end of June 2013, and it was set at 47.5 %. By recapitalizing financial sector, the government is 
to become one of most important shareholders with an EUR 1.5 billion capital infusion. 
Cyprus ended the bailout program in March 2016. So, while the bail-in may be viewed as a triumph it 
included some significant downfalls. The bail-in included the goal of the two biggest banks to merge with huge 
costs that are following it.  
 
GREECE 
As a result of these policies, the Greek GPD decrease by 26.2%, drastically increasing the unemployment 
rate from 7.8% in 2008. to 24.9% in 2015. The housing prices plummeted due to increased unemployment, 
salary cuts, tax increases. As for the main results, it is shown that Greece was one of the first EU members who 
introduced and passed the law regarding bank resolution that helped the implement resolution measures such is 
capital control over an extended period of time. By the end of 2015, both the government and private sector 
raised EUR 63 billion. The era of foreign banks in Greece ended with the acquisition of three subsidiaries by the 
local bank and the closure of 8 branches. Local banks maintained a strategic distance on the Cyprus banking 
emergency by purchasing three of their banks. 
In August 2018, the bailout program ended. Majority of the debt is owed to the EU emergency creditors, 
however they have agreed that there won't be any new measures until the debt is paid. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
After reviewing and analyzing different scenarios where countries handled the crisis following a general 
framework, it is concluded that most of this crisis was preventable. The main reason for the development of 
crisis is the systematic risk which increases with every irrational decision made by the management. Following 
that, an intentional overseeing of issues and delaying them leads to an increase in moral hazard behavior. 
Expecting the government intervention, each time the bank is threatened due to the possible closure, these 
institutions are hoping for it to happen. This type of behavior is decreasing the commitment to repaying debt and 
losing the future trust of the general public. 
An interesting question arises from the concept of government intervention, does the delay in 
implementing the intervention measures? The response time seems to be crucial in handling, however, there is 
still not a model created in the history that can support this. The closest one was Cyprus back in 2013 where the 
banking sector was closed for two days due to not agreeing on the intervention proposition simply wanting the 
better deal.   
During the financial crisis, experts had an opportunity to analyze how different methodology tools are 
being used in real-time and to what extent. Fiscal policies created by the end of 2015 are holding very well and 
maintaining economic stability, which leaves the space for development and growth.  
To determine the effects of the bailout in the US, the 2008 subprime crisis will be used in an example. 
The government accepted the “Troubled Assets Relief Program” (TARP) worth around $700 billion and started 
bailouts of domestic institutions. The mechanism showed to be right, resulting in profit at the end. 
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